Is what we hear about migration really true? : questioning eight stereotypes : core messages by THIBOS, Cameron
IS WHAT WE HEAR ABOUT MIGRATION  
REALLY TRUE?  
QUESTIONING EIGHT STEREOTYPES
CORE MESSAGES

For decades, the topic of immigration has been polarising 
European political arenas. The view that immigration can 
be a positive contribution to Europe has had its defendants 
and its opponents, and it has often been the matter of harsh 
debates. In recent years, however, the dispute between the 
two groups often seems to have largely vanished. If not all 
politicians share the same principles about migration and 
migrants, fewer and fewer dare to defend the view that mi-
gration is, and will continue to be, needed. They follow the 
trends of public opinion, in which increasingly large frac-
tions see migrants as competitors in labour markets beset 
by unemployment, burdens on endangered welfare systems, 
and a factor of social disruption. 
This is in large part a result of the current crisis, which has ex-
acerbated economic and social tensions and given rise to the 
search for scapegoats. If the opinion that migration is a threat 
rather than an asset prevails, there is a risk that European 
States will forego the positive benefits of immigration and 
make decisions that undermine Europe’s recovery from the 
crisis and, ultimately, its leading position in the world.
This booklet re-thinks eight migration stereotypes in the 
light of research findings established by the Migration Policy 
Centre. It is based on the detailed volume: “Is what we hear 
about migration really true? Questioning eight stereotypes.”
– Philippe Fargues, Director of the Migration Policy Centre
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It is a common belief that migration harms 
European societies, and that the European 
Union would be better off with either very 
few immigrants or none at all. Such percep-
tions are misguided, and they risk causing 
serious damage to the EU’s economy, living 
standards, and global clout if they are used 
as a basis for policy.
The EU is shrinking. The EU27 held 14.5% 
of the world’s population after World War II. 
Today, with a total population of 500 mil-
lion, the EU’s relative weight has been cut in 
half (7%). EUROSTAT predicts that without 
further migration, the combined population 
of the EU27 in 2050 will be 58 million less 
than it was in 2010. If the EU continues to 
lose people, one unavoidable consequence 
will be the loss of its prominence in interna-
tional affairs and global institutions.
The EU is also getting older. An increase in 
the old-age dependency ratio from 28% in 
2010 to 44% in 2030 means that the ratio of 
elderly people withdrawing from pension 
and welfare systems to those paying into 
them will increase from a bit more than 
one quarter to almost one half (please note 
that the old-age dependency ratio is the 
number of older persons [age 65+] per 100 
working-age persons [aged 20-64 years]). 
This will make such systems unsustainable.
The EU workforce is also ageing rapidly 
(see figure). The number of young people 
(below 45) in the workforce, those with 
cutting-edge knowledge, will drop by a 
quarter over the next 11 years without 
further migration. On the other hand, the 
quantity of old workers (age 45+) will re-
main more or less constant. Such an ageing 
of the skills will negatively affect the EU’s 
global competitiveness.
Natural increase and the incorporation of 
currently acceding states, even when com-
bined, will not be enough to reverse these 
trends. However, immigration offers one 
method of mitigating their effects. The con-
tinued acceptance of young, working-age 
migrants will: bolster the EU’s workforce; 
help its social insurance systems remain 
solvent; and contribute to the global com-
petitiveness of its economy.
“WE DO nOt nEED migRants”
stEREOtypE
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Projection of the employed population aged below 45 by Member State, 2010-2025, in 
the no migration scenario
Source: Calculation based on Eurostat population projections with no migration (in Fargues 
and McCormick 2013)
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KEY TRENDS*
•	The population of the EU has increased 
continuously from 180 million in 1952 to 
500 million in 2010. Of this increase, 70% 
(248 million) came from enlargement, while 
30% (72 million) came from natural increase 
and migration.
•	The share of the world’s population living in 
the EU27 has steadily decreased, from 14.5% 
(380 million) in 1952 to 7% (500 million).
With no more migration, over the next twenty years:
•	The EU27 will lose 33 million (-11%) work-
ing-age persons.
•	The EU’s old-age dependency ratio, people 
aged 65+ to the number of working-age peo-
ple (20-65), will increase from 28% to 44%.
•	The portion of young workers (20-30) in the 
EU labour force will decrease by 25% while 
those aged 60-70 will increase by 29%.
*Projections based on MPC’s demographic models
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One of the most pervasive stereotypes in mi-
gration discourses today is that immigrants 
cause unemployment rates to rise by under-
cutting wages and occupying scarce jobs.
The 2009 European Social Survey found 
that the share of the population who viewed 
migrants as competitors for jobs varied 
greatly depending on the Member State, 
with an EU27 average of just under 50%. 
We found that negative attitudes toward 
migrants were strongly correlated with un-
employment. In other words, the higher the 
unemployment rate the higher the share of 
respondents who thought immigrants take 
jobs away from native workers, and thus 
it seems the negative perception is rooted 
more in socio-economic hardship than in 
immigration.
Indeed, migrants often avoid countries of 
high unemployment. We found that im-
migration and unemployment rates were 
negatively correlated in the majority of EU 
MS surveyed (15 of 23) after the crisis hit in 
2008. In other words, states with high em-
ployment had high levels of immigration, 
and vice versa. Ten of these countries also 
followed the dominant trend before the cri-
sis began.
For five MS, migration and unemployment 
levels began to move in the same direction 
– the two measures became positively cor-
related – once the crisis hit. Only three MS 
(Latvia, Cyprus and Luxembourg) show 
either positive or negative correlations in 
both periods, and in doing so provide some 
evidence to back up the stereotype.
Why is high migration more often than 
not correlated with low unemployment? 
In part, it is because migrants gravitate 
to places where unemployment is low as 
they are more likely to find work there. It 
is also in part due to the fact that govern-
ments often restrict migrant entry during 
periods of high unemployment, which 
causes the two measures to move in op-
posite directions. Whatever the combi-
nation of factors, the dominant, negative 
correlation shows that using migration as 
a scapegoat for unemployment is largely 
unfounded.
“migRants stEal OuR jObs”
stEREOtypE
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EU (27 Member States) quarterly unemployment by annual net migration, 2001-2012
Source: Eurostat, McCormick (2012)
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It is often thought that the path out of the 
current crisis is through the revitalisation 
and improvement of Europe’s knowledge 
economies. As such, it is commonly as-
sumed that Europe no longer needs the type 
of labour that low-skilled migrants provide. 
Following this logic, MS migration policy 
usually attempts to attract highly-skilled 
migrants while containing and discouraging 
low-skilled migration. This is misguided. 
Low-skilled labourers are still necessary for 
national economies to function, but as a re-
sult of such migration policies the demand 
now often exceeds the supply.
Low-skilled migrant labour also allows for 
the social mobility of natives. When mi-
grants take over less desirable, but neces-
sary work, they open up the space needed 
for natives to pursue higher-paying, high-
er-skilled employment opportunities. They 
also fill jobs left vacant by native workers, 
who perceive such employment as unde-
sirable for reasons of low pay or low social 
status, among others. 
This is often true for national industries 
that require large, steady workforces and 
are harmed by high turnover. The Italian 
dairy industry, which grossed €15 billion 
in 2011, is a good example of this. Wages 
are fairly high, contracts are long term, and 
the industry is a point of national pride, 
but for reasons of social status and person-
al aspiration native Italians refuse to milk 
cows. Migrant labour now keeps the indus-
try running, and today it is estimated that 
nine out of every 10 dairy workers are from 
India. This is just one of many sectors in 
EU economies today that continues to need 
low-skilled, third-country labour in order 
to stay afloat.
It is also important to note that EU member 
states are not the same and thus it is incor-
rect to generalise what the EU ‘needs’. They 
also attract different profiles of migrants, 
even from within a single country of ori-
gin, and employ them for different tasks. 
Italy draws on India almost completely for 
low-skilled workers, such as cow milking. In 
contrast, the United Kingdom engages pre-
dominantly semi-skilled and highly-skilled 
Indians for work across the entire employ-
ment spectrum (see figure).
“WE DO nOt nEED lOW-skillED 
immigRants in thE Eu”
stEREOtypE
3
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Indian migrant stocks by occupation in the UK and Italy
Sources: UK, Annual Population Survey 2011; Italy, Labour Force Suvey 2008
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It is often thought that migrants take more 
than they give from their new countries of 
residence. This is particularly visible in dis-
cussions of welfare systems, where migrants 
are often labeled as benefit seekers or wel-
fare tourists, among others.
This perception most likely comes from the 
frequent use of highly conspicuous aspects 
of social insurance by some low-income 
migrants, such as unemployment benefits, 
subsidized housing, and child allowances. 
However, all of these services are relatively 
cheap for the state to provide, paling in com-
parison to the cost of government healthcare 
and pension systems. As migrants groups are 
structurally younger than native-born pop-
ulations (see stereotype 1), as well as usually 
economically active, an above-average per-
centage of migrants pays into pension and 
healthcare schemes while a below-average 
share makes use of those benefits. For this rea-
son, foreign-born populations are net positive 
contributors to the welfare systems of nearly 
every European country. For countries where 
this is not the case, the fault lies more with 
the barriers to entry that migrants face when 
accessing labour markets than with immigra-
tion per se. 
Migrants are also thought to somehow threat-
en welfare systems and undermine group 
solidarity because some perceive them to be 
different from the majority population. The 
premise to this argument is that groups are 
more willing to redistribute wealth the more 
homogenous they are. However, there is little 
evidence that birthplace diversity negatively 
affects solidarity in Europe. In fact, the op-
posite is true. Immigration and the diversity 
arising from it translate into more positive 
attitudes toward redistribution. This is largely 
due to class interests that span the immigrant/
native divide. Highly-skilled natives perceive 
that similarly-skilled immigrants contribute to 
their economic interests and thus are willing to 
expand social safety nets to cover them. At the 
other end of the spectrum, low-skilled natives, 
like low-skilled migrants, make more frequent 
use of welfare systems. They are thus more 
concerned with maintaining access to benefits 
than with the nationality of other beneficiaries.
“migRants unDERminE OuR 
WElFaRE systEms”
stEREOtypE
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Differences in the net direct fiscal contribution of immigrant and native-born house-
holds and the role of different characteristics, 2007-2009
Source: Kaczmarczyk (2013) based on OECD (2013: 151)
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The stereotype that migration hampers in-
novation starts from the premise that mi-
grants are low-skilled labour, and thus do 
not contribute to a nation’s innovative ca-
pacity. Since low-skilled migrants also ac-
cept low wages, it is further presumed that 
firms will not invest in R&D and labour- 
saving techniques if there is an abundant 
supply of migrant labour at their finger-
tips. This slows down the modernisation of 
industries and dulls Europe’s competitive 
edge. This logic is flawed for the simple rea-
son that not all migrants are low-skilled.
Research shows that both highly-skilled mi-
grants and highly-diverse workplaces pos-
itively impact innovation. This is because 
immigrants both invent and contribute to 
the inventions of others. One way of seeing 
this is by looking at patent applications. We 
find that countries with relatively open im-
migration policies for specific, highly-skilled 
sectors receive more patent applications 
than those with more restrictive policies. 
This research further finds that there are 
positive spillover effects from these sectors 
on the wages and innovative capacities of 
both complementary and non-related fields. 
In addition to this, studies show that overall 
diversity in the workplace, both in terms of 
the number of migrants and in terms of how 
many countries they represent, positively 
contributes to productivity. This is true at 
the regional, sector, and firm levels.
Low-skilled migrants also have a role to 
play in the pursuit of innovation. By taking 
over some duties, such as child-care, they 
free highly-skilled workers to concentrate 
on other pursuits. This means that migra-
tion may actually help spur Europe out of 
the crisis rather than hinder its recovery. It 
will also contribute to Europe’s competitive-
ness at a time when challenges from South 
Korea, China and India are becoming more 
intense (see figure).
“migRatiOn hampERs OuR 
capacity tO innOvatE”
stEREOtypE
5
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Total patent applications for selected countries, 1883-2012
Source: WIPO Statistical Database, last updated January 2014
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Member States in the south-east of Europe 
often claim that they are overwhelmed by un-
precedented numbers of asylum seekers cross-
ing the Mediterranean and require increased 
burden sharing from more sheltered coun-
tries if they are to continue to accept refugees. 
Official statistics, however, draw a very differ-
ent picture of the situation. There are indeed 
rising numbers of forced migrants around the 
world, but they are neither flooding Europe 
nor are they disproportionately found in sup-
posedly ‘front-line’ states.
The current number of refugees around the 
world is much lower than it was 20 years ago. 
Global refugee populations peaked with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, dropped throughout the 
1990s, and has held steady at around 10 mil-
lion people since the turn of the millennium. 
The number of internally displaced people 
(IDPs) on the other hand, those who have es-
caped their homes but not their country, has 
skyrocketed from under 5 million in 1998 to 
21 million today (see figure 1).
European countries are obliged by the Geneva 
Convention to offer these at-risk people pro-
tection. However, as borders have become 
increasingly difficult to cross they are more 
likely to end up as IDPs or in a country neigh-
bouring their own. Today the vast majority of 
the world’s refugees and forced migrants are 
not in Europe but they are near it. This pro-
vides Europe with a false sense of security, for 
while relatively few refugees are on European 
territory the political stability of the neighbour-
hood in which it operates is increasingly at risk. 
Only a small portion of refugees that seek 
asylum in Europe do so in front-line coun-
tries, i.e. Greece, Italy and Malta. According to 
EUROSTAT, Germany, France and Sweden, 
all far from the troubles in the south-east, ac-
counted for 57% of all asylum applications 
lodged in the EU last year. The picture changes 
slightly when we look as the number of asylum 
applicants per capita, which shows Sweden, 
Malta and Luxembourg as being under the 
most pressure to accommodate (see figure 2). 
Greece and Italy, on the other hand, are asked 
to give less than other states in both absolute 
and relative terms despite the number of head-
line-grabbing boat landings that happen on 
their shores.
“OuR sOuthERn cOastlinE is 
FlOODED With asylum sEEkERs”
stEREOtypE
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Fig.1 – Numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons 1998-2013
Source: Authors’ graph, based on UNHCR data
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Fig.2 – Number of asylum applications per million inhabitants in 2013
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It is a common refrain that some migrants 
arriving to the EU by boat from across the 
Mediterranean want to cheat the asylum 
system in order to gain access to European 
labour markets. This flow of people is also 
assumed to be getting stronger.
The reality is different. Between 1998 and 
2009 the number of people crossing annu-
ally from Africa to Europe did not mark-
edly increase. The most recent years have 
been more erratic, with uncommonly low 
numbers of arrivals in 2010 and 2012 off-
set by spikes in 2011 and 2013. The total 
for 2014 will also be high because of: the 
growing number of Syrians attempting to 
enter Europe by sea; the current political 
situation in Libya, which gives free reign to 
human smugglers; and Italy’s Mare Nostrum 
programme, which has rescued nearly 
50,000 people since it began last October.
The risk of dying during the voyage, how-
ever, has dramatically increased since the 
turn of the millennium, to the point that the 
Mediterranean crossing is now one of the 
most dangerous sea routes in the world (see 
figure 1). The probability of dying has been 
consistently above 3%, meaning 30 people 
die for every 1000 that attempt to cross, for 
every year except 2010 according to MPC’s 
calculations. The rising death toll is largely 
due to the cat and mouse game being played 
on the high seas, in which migrants adapt to 
more intense surveillance by taking longer 
and more dangerous routes. 
Migrants arriving by sea are different from 
Europe’s other migrants and should not be 
assumed to be job seekers in disguise. They 
are overwhelmingly from Sub-Saharan 
Africa, particularly Eritrea, Nigeria and 
Somalia, as well as a handful of other trou-
ble spots such as Syria and Afghanistan 
(see figure 2). With some exceptions these 
are not the main countries of origin for 
immigrants or asylum seekers in the EU. 
However, they are all countries with ex-
treme political conditions, and most people 
fleeing them would qualify for internation-
al protection if they made it across the sea. 
This is true even if they pass through sever-
al other countries on their way to Europe, 
as the countries they transit are often as 
dangerous as their own.
“EcOnOmic migRants aRE tRying 
tO chEat OuR asylum systEm”
stEREOtypE
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Fig.1 – Arrivals at sea in Italy, Spain, Malta and Greece 1998-2014
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It is commonly assumed that the quality of 
schools gets worse the more immigrants there 
are in the student body. Statistics are used to 
support this claim, which seem to show that 
children of immigrants underperform when 
compared to the children of natives regard-
less of the type of school, grade level, or MS 
of residence. This evidence is being misread. 
It is not the child’s origin that makes him or 
her less likely to succeed in school, but the 
level of resources at their disposal.
We analysed 2009 PISA data on school per-
formance and social background for nearly 
120,000 students across the EU15. We want-
ed to know if children with a multicultur-
al background – those with one native and 
one foreign-born parent – fared better than 
children with a monocultural background 
– those with two native or two foreign-born 
parents. We found that children of mixed 
couples perform significantly better than 
the children of immigrants. Furthermore, 
when compared with native children a mul-
ticultural background either boosted per-
formance or had no effect. In short, having a 
multicultural background did not hurt.
There are some countries, such as Germany, 
where having a multicultural background 
appeared to negatively affect school perfor-
mance at first glance, however this vanished 
when we controlled for socio-economic 
characteristics. In other words, the fact that 
a large percentage of migrants underperform 
in school is not because one of their parents 
was born in a different country, but because 
a large percentage of multicultural families 
belong to a socio-economic class that affords 
them only limited access to resources. 
We also wanted to know what the average 
effect of immigrant children is on school 
performance. We found that while high 
numbers of immigrants are indeed found 
in low-performing schools, suggesting at 
first blush that they are causing the schools 
to underperform, once again the corre-
lation disappears once socio-economic 
characteristics are taken into account. Our 
study, which looked at nearly 5,000 schools 
across the EU15, found that school per-
formance is unequivocally rooted in their 
socio-economic composition and not in 
their ethnic makeup.
“OuR chilDREn suFFER FROm 
having immigRants in class”
stEREOtypE
8
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Average differential in reading performance by country of residence and origin before 
and after controlling for structural characteristics (*), 2009 (**) 
Notes: (*) The following structural characteristics were controlled for: sex, parents’ education-
al and occupational level, PISA Index of home cultural possessions and type of family; (**) No 
significant values are marked in blank
Source: Authors’ elaboration on PISA-2009
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